23 July 2007

Why I won't get a Combat Action Badge...

The clearing operations we’ve been doing in Baqubah have been relatively uneventful (considering the number of soldiers involved) since I got here. During the operation were involved in now, clearing Old Baqubah, we really only took fire in the first hour or so. When we were on the west side of Baqubah, after the first two days, we only had sporadic contact with the enemy. We’ve had people killed (mostly by IEDs), and more injured, but considering the number of soldiers moving on the ground, and compared to the types of losses my battalion was seeing before I got here, the losses from this operation are light. Similarly, during the two operations I’ve been a part of (on the west and east sides), we’ve largely failed to capture the high level Al Queda (AQ) and Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) targets we were hoping to scoop up.

The six weeks I was at Fort Lewis, preparing to come here were terrible for my battalion. We lost 10 men and 6 Strykers in six weeks. Six men from my company, and Russian reporter were killed when their Stryker was destroyed by a giant, deep-buried IED. Only the driver survived. I don’t know the number of soldiers who were wounded in that same time period, but I do know it was significant. Baqubah was declared by the ISI as the new capital of a fundamental Islamic Iraq – after the surge began high-level AQ and ISI leaders fled the 30 miles north to Baqubah to establish their new headquarters. All of this to say that Baqubah, especially Old Baqubah, where we’re operating right now, is a very dangerous place, a place not to be taken lightly.

So, why has it been so quiet here since I arrived and why have we been unable to capture any of these AQ and ISI leaders? I argue that it’s largely the same reason for both. We attacked this city in a slow, smart, methodical way. We went from a battalion to a brigade plus (four or so battalions) to hold the city. Instead of moving through the city in small groups and leaving, we cleared routes, held them then moved into the city, clearing building by building, holding the ground we’d taken. It took time and coordination to build the combat power to be able to do this all. It took time, it took more and more people, and because eventually (I hope) we’re going to hand Iraq off to Iraqis (and evidently they’re already ready) we had to tell the Iraqi Army about it. All of this, combined with a flawed cordon, lead to a large number of leaders, and perhaps fighters, fleeing Baqubah. The commanders of my battalion and my brigade made the decision to conduct this fight slowly and safely (as safe goes in the Army). They must have known that the slower, the larger, these operations got, the fewer AQ and ISI members they would find. They decided that force protection was more important than getting every insurgent we could.

And do you know why I agree that it should have been done the way we did it? Because this place isn’t worth it. The Army will continue to do its job. We will stay, trying to accomplish the objectives we’re given, trying to provide some measure of stability to this country until the bastards in suits (read this - now) tell us to come home. That said, this place is not worth taking chances. We might have been able to cut off more of the head of the insurgency in Baqubah if we hadn’t waited for the rest of the brigade to arrive, or if we had been more aggressive in going on raids or clearing. And that might have had an impact on the ability of Al Queda to operate in Iraq. Or it might have had no impact on the insurgency. But it would have gotten more of my men and my friends killed and maimed, rest assured. As military leaders, we’ll continue to do our best to accomplish our mission; but our first mission is bring everyone home in one piece.

I’m not quite as bitter as Audrey (though she’s not really as bitter as her blog makes her seem) – I would love it if I could help Iraqis. I feel bad kicking Iraqis out of their houses for a night so we can use it as an overwatch. I feel bad for blowing up the door to a shop to search it, knowing that we may have destroyed the livelihood of that shop owner just because his locks were too good. It was kind of nice delivering food to people (though the mob mentality that developed made me hate people, all people, just a little more), helping the people who’s city we’ve been blowing up. But it’s not worth taking risks that get my men killed. We’ll clear Baqubah, hand it off and go home. Maybe this place will be a little safer for us having been here. Hopefully. Hopefully all of Iraq will be safer. Maybe a couple decades down the line Iraq will look a bit like Vietnam does today. I’ll do my job to the best of my ability, but this place isn’t worth my guys dying.

posted by Interested Soldier @ 04:20