THE INTERESTED SOLDIER

I, and others, have some issues with some of the Professional Military Education institutions and processes (GEN Scales, LTC Dempsey), but the system is necessary, and often produces some really interesting, thought-provoking articles. This is such a case.

A retired US Army Colonel and a Civil War Scholar wrote an article for the Small Wars Journal (a non-profit, non-military-affiliated scholarly organization) about the considerations and issues that the US military would face if the President invoked the Insurrection Act to eliminate the forcible takeover of a town in the United States by an armed militia. It's a good piece, and relatively short - feel free to go read it now. Right Here

The article brings up several interesting conflicts created by the restrictions placed on military intelligence operations against US persons (citizens and resident aliens, organizations/corporations made up primarily of citizens and resident aliens). Several executive orders and legislation restrict the ability of the US intelligence community to collect and maintain intelligence within the boundaries of the US, and against US persons - even when working with civilian law enforcement agencies. Were the US Army called upon to plan military operations on US soil against US citizens, military intelligence personnel would be severely limited in the use of all intelligence disciplines (including overhead imagery platforms - the article points out that they would likely be forced to use commercial, unclassified mediums for mapping), and would have to liaise significantly with local, state and federal law enforcement personnel. The article does not question the necessity of all of these restrictions - instead it discusses the ways in which US Army personnel would have to work within their guidelines.

They also bring up the issues of maintaining operational security (OPSEC) while conducting operations in the United States - soldiers who know people in the area, an unrestrained free press, and a 24-hour news cycle constantly second guessing the operations. The amount of coordination needed between the military and federal civilian leadership (in this case, the Attorney General overseeing all military operations) would pose issues, not so much in conflict between military and civilian leadership, but simply coordination. Rules of engagement would be eschewed in favor of standing rules for the the use of force (a different set of standards that would have to be taught to troops). Finally, coordination between the Army, who would conduct limited military operations, and state and federal law enforcement organizations who would arrest criminals involved in the insurrection, and enforce laws in the stead of recently removed militias/cooperating local law enforcement. The article poses several interesting complications to the traditional military planning systems, and makes some limited recommendations for staffing changes at higher echelon elements.

All well and good until an editorialist from the Examiner (a conservative-leaning series of locally tailored newspapers that bought the San Francisco Examiner name a masthead a few years back) read it. The editorial writer, Anthony Martin, (who links to his ministry site from the editorial) uses any number of tropes and logical fallacies (including one of my favorites, the "some say") to conflate this article with US Army policy. Misinterpreting the nature of hypothetical exercises and wargaming, Mr. Martin says that the Small Wars article shows that the "future warfare will be conducted on our own soil. The military will use its full force against our own citizens. The enemy will be average citizens whose values resonate with those articulated by the tea party." Essentially, Martin fails to differentiate between "could" and "will" and the difference between "average citizens whose values resonate with those articulated by the tea party" and hypothetical violent insurrectionists who use the name Tea Party. The scenario is titled "The Scenario (2016)," but Mr. Martin would have you think it was titled "The Plan (2016)."

The editorial piece concludes:

And with the publication of the Benson and Weber article, it is now clear that the U.S. Army considers it a valid proposition to assume that a future civil war will be sparked not by extremist Islamists with dirty bombs or left wing insurrectionists inspired by Alinsky or Ayers but by the tea party and the conservatives who participate in it.

Before I get to the larger anti-intellectual nature of the article, I am going to wreck his conclusion with logic, clause by clause. "And with the publication of the Benson and Weber article, it is now clear that the U.S. Army considers it a valid proposition..." No. COL (R) Benson is retired and teaches a seminar at Fort Leavenworth - he does not set policy. "...to assume that a future civil war will be sparked not by extremist Islamists with dirty bombs..." Yes, that is a valid assumption for any person to make. Foreign terrorism does not set off a civil war. Look at the US following 9/11 - we came together as a society. "...or left wing insurrectionists inspired by Alinsky or Ayers..." No. This assumption is never stated, implicitly or explictly, in the Small Wars Journal article. And if it had, it would not be an unreasonable thing to say - there are significanly more right-wing insurrectionist organizations in the US than left-wing ones (and they tend to be better armed). There are plenty of liberal terrorist organizations, but they rarely hold ground. "by the tea party and the conservatives who participate in it." No. Again, Martin fails to differentiate between "conservatives who participate in [the tea party]" and hypothetical violent insurrectionists who use the name Tea Party.

 Finally, and perhaps most frighteningly, the editorial is implicitly anti-intellectual. The fact that the author doesn't understand (or pretends not to understand for the sake of hyperbole) the difference between policy and hypotheticals written for academic purpose is concerning. The Small Wars piece is an academic exercise, a war game, designed to find faults and strengths in our current system should federal forces be called upon to put down an insurrection on US soil. The nature of the insurrection is irrelevant to the article. Had this article been written in 1996, the organization responsible would have been a militia or a cultist religious organization. The Tea Party (and in this case, the violent extremists who have attached themselves to the outskirts of the Tea Party) name was used because it's topical.

Essentially, the editorial assumes any number of facts not in evidence, conflates an independant article with US Army policy and strays into paranoid fantasy - all to accuse of the Pentagon of liberal conspiracy.

No, not really. But he is, evidently, thinking about the same things I am. Here

This is precisely the reason it is time to get rid of the all-volunteer force. It has been too successful. Our relatively small and highly adept military has made it all too easy for our nation to go to war -- and to ignore the consequences.

Perhaps that is true, but it seems to me that isn't enough reason. As I said before, government-sponsored slavery (with a high mortality rate) [to paraphrase another friend of the blog] is, perhaps, not the best way to hold politicians accountable for their actions.

This comes from a different friend of the blog, perhaps a bit closer to home:

So I have a funny story: Once upon a time, there was a young CPT getting ready for work, she really had to pee! As she slips on some Army PTs and running shoes without socks, a mandatory uniform just to go to the port-a-john, she can hear yelling coming from the tent next to hers. It's hard to hear at first, but as she gets closer to the door to make a dash for the port-a-john she can make out what's really going on... "Take your Shit, and get the F*c$3 out of this tent!" As the young CPT steps outside, the light is blinding, and then she see it, a LOVERS' QUARREL! The young CPT forgets for a second that she has to pee, just so she can be entertained for a moment of what's unfolding right before her eyes. There are things laying on the ground, they were not gently placed there, these items had been thrown, and with aggression too! "Take your Shit, and never come back to this tent!" the angry female Soldier is livid about something. That's when the young CPT asks, "Do you need anything?" to the other female Soldier standing by as if a lookout for the two fighting. "I'll be right back!" the young CPT says, as she makes her dash for the port-a-john. She pees as quickly as possible, so she doesn't miss a thing, rarely is there anything going on at the FOB she has now accepted to call home. Once done, she returns to the scene of the lovers' quarrel, and the young male Soldier is gone, along with the things that had been thrown out of anger. The young CPT is relieved everything is okay now, but sad she did not get to witness the female Soldier punch this guy, who was apparently cheating on the young lady, in the face! As the young CPT headed back to her tent to continue getting ready for work, and continue with the same routine she always goes through, the young CPT's NCOIC comes in and informs her, the two were to be married upon return from this deployment, and she had told the PFC male to not return to the female tent area without his NCO! After a few moments to take in everything that just took place, it hits the young CPT, why did these two look so familiar? Why did she feel like she had meet them somewhere, but can't quite put her finger on it?... That's when the young CPT realizes!!! They were the ones the young CPT and NCOIC had walked in on while they were in the middle of "attempting" to make love on the dirty nasty floor of the force provider BATHROOM that had not been set up yet the other night!"

-The End

 

Setting aside some obvious political reasons why these changes might not be made (merely mentioning the draft is rather unpopular, anti-ERA-esque "women should stay in the kitchen" conservatives, etc), perhaps the real question I'm asking here is: What *legitimate* reason is there that women don't have to register for Selective Service?

 

Like in previous posts, I will refer largely to the Army (it being what I know), while most of what I speak applies to the US Military as a whole. Similarly, I will address the roles currently allowed to women in the US military, not how that might or should change in the future - that I'll likely save for a future post as well.

 

In the US Army, women can not serve in the 11- (Infantry), 13- (Field Artillery), 19- (Armor), 18- (Special Forces)-series MOSes. They can serve in almost every other MOS series (For instance 09, 12, 14, 15, 21, 25, 27, 29, 31, 35, 36, 37, 38, 42, 46, 56, 68, 74, 79, 88, 91, 92, and 94). Were a conflict to arise that would require the reenstatement of the Draft, the Army will need more than just Infantry. It's going to need medics (68), truck drivers (88), mechanics (91), supply SGTs (92), constuction engineers (21), etc., etc.  The Women's Army Corps was dissolved in 1978. Women have been doing basic training with men since 1977. Though still prevented from serving in some direct combat missions, women have been fully integrated into the US Army since the Carter Administration. Overall, the jobs that currently exclude women make up something less than 20% of the Army.

  

Just as, during the second World War women filled many of the civilian jobs vacated by drafted men (Rosie the Riveter, "A League of Their Own", my own grandmother who operated an overhead crane, builing aircraft for the war), women are more than capable of filling non-combat military jobs that might otherwise be filled by men. If we are dead set on keeping women out of the Infantry/Armor/Etc, we can make women medics and cooks and truck drivers and constuction engineers, and make all of the male draftees Infanty and Armor soldiers.

 

 

 

"I've been in Afghanistan for about 5 months now, about half of our deployment, in RC-South (about 20% of the country, lower in elevation, higher in excitement), deployed in a non-combat job in an Infantry Brigade.

This is my third combat Brigade, and by far the least ready to plan and execute missions. We failed at planning and executing our MRX prior to NTC. We failed to get a functional targeting cycle at NTC. By all rights we should probably not be here.

Our soldiers are doing well. They know what to do once we give them a mission. But my brigade cannot do it. We cannot plan and coordinate a mission more than, probably 4 days out.

I have seen field-grade officers who have the emotional maturity of small children. People who I do not trust. A lieutenant can sometimes be forgiven for neglecting to do an initial counseling. A Major cannot, especially when he gets furious because his expectations (never expressed) are not met.

You cannot tell a lieutenant, "Make and run a Battalion CUB," without giving guidance. We are supposed to train our subordinates - if you don't, their failures are entirely your own.

A company commander does not need to accompany every mission that sends two platoons outside of the wire. If you have more Majors than Platoons that leave the FOB, perhaps you should go home.

We have officers and senior NCOs that get moved jobs FOBs and raters, on a whim, via a message delivered third hand, without knowing that job they'll be moved into. Without so much as an explanation.

We have a massive EO [equal opportunity - Army for anti-descrimination] problem. Field grades say shit you'd be lock up a private for. Female officers and NCOs are NOT given the same opportunity as men - in gender immaterial positions.

We are flying, or falling, by the seat of our pants, more than half way through our tour. It isn't getting better. Every company grade officer I know in this Battalion is seriously considering getting out, changing branch, etc.

In response to this editorial:

 

 

Go ahead, read it. It's short, I'll wait here.

 

We don't need a draft. The current US military is not broken. Some small number of its people are broken (see SSG Bales, others), but the military, its systems, and overall, its personnel are not broken. Tired, sure (see my previous post), but we do not need to start pulling unsuspecting young men (and women, but we'll get to that later) out of their homes and into our various wars.

 

I will refer throughout the following two posts largely to the US Army, but much of what I speak of will refer to the entire US Military.

 

The Army's strength is in its values. Many of those values are held by a large section of America, but the Army is better for having people self-select into it. For having people who enter the Army understanding and sharing those values. Most importantly, people who want to be in the Army. A professional, competent engaged military is not built by compelling people at random into it, training them a minimum amount (because you only have them for a limited time), and sending them, unwilling, into combat.

 

When I was a Platoon leader, I had any number of soldiers who were looking forward to getting out. Who had not anticipated getting extended into a 15-month deployment. But I never had to worry that any of them were there at (what amounts to) gunpoint. We all chose to get into our predicament, and that choice, that fellowship helped us get through and accomplish what we had to do.

 

The last remaining draftee retired from the Army last year in 2011 after 39 years of service. He was the senior enlisted advisor for an Army Corps - that's a big damn deal. He proves that there is no inherent corelation between draftees and bad Soldiers. He was forced into the Army, but he stayed in and rose to his position by choice - and it is that choice that makes the Army stronger.

 

The following sentence from the editorial,"Sergeant Bales would not have served more than two tours in Iraq and certainly would not have been sent to Afghanistan." is patently false. SSG Bales was still in the Army because he made the decision, likely two or three times, to stay in it. Sure, that decision was likely affected by economics, as well personal choice and the inputs of his family, but it was a decision he was allowed to make, knowing the consequences and benefits.

 

Of course, nothing in this post is meant to argue against the utility, and potential necessity of a draft. Were the Chinese to take Alaska and start marching south across the Yukon, we would need to, and should, reenstate a draft. But the draft should only be used when needed - when the man-power needs of the military cannot be met another way. Generally, against an existential threat, or at least in a situation that warrents it. We didn't need (nor can we afford) a standing Army of 1 million to fight the wars in Afghanistan and (previously) Iraq. We increased the size of the Army (slightly) by recruiting to meet our needs. And we met them.

 

 

The second issue I'll address, in my next post, is only tangentially related to the editorial. Why don't women have to register with Selective Service when they turn 18?

 

 

 

 

 

I was asked to respond to the idea of "Destruction as occupation"... I suppose I had never thought of it that way.
 
I have any number of good justifications.

 

When I was a PL - I think my best one - was this: I, as a brand new Lieutenant, have no ability to change the strategic mission, no ability to change the direction of a conflict (or prevent/end one, for that matter). I do, however, have to the ability to change the face of the conflict, on a small scale. Almost all of the major war crimes, the horrific things done by American soldiers (My Lai, Abu Gharib, the kill squad from a couple years ago), were done because of terrible leadership (the exception being this most recent murder spree done by one man). Abu Garhib was a lack of leadership and accountability. Ditto the kill squad. My Lai was one terrible, psychotic leader (2LT Calley) and a lack of leadership above him ensuring he wasn't ordering his men to do murder. By being present, being a leader who enforces the laws of war, who ensures accountability, I prevent one small unit from doing terrible things. Plus, by the end of that first deployment, I had actually been able to do some good. We cleared Baqubah of a violent organization that put IEDs in the road and kidnapped people for ransom to raise funds. On a small scale, when we left, we had (it seemed, and I hope) reduced the overall level of violence, and restored some normalcy to the Iraqis living there.
 
As I move higher and higher in rank, further from a tactical role, and on to staff, that is less and less applicable. My last job was to ensure we had the things (food, fuel, construction materials, contracts, water, euqipment, etc., etc., etc.) that we needed to do whatever mission we had. It's fairly removed from the fight, and removed from the local populace. I ensured, the best I could, that my fellow soldiers were safe and comfortable. I tried not to break any procurment laws. Internal justification came from helping my comrades.
 
Now, still on staff, this time as an inteligence officer, I try to keep my guys safe again. I try to figure out who the enemy is so that we can separate him from the population he hides in. Again, trying to minimize the destruction. Capture him so he can be interrogated (in accordance with fairly strict humanitatian guidelines - no one with more than half a brain is messing around interrogations after the post-Abu Garhib reforms), and find more bad dudes. This time my job is to keep my guys, my unit, safe from harm (by anticipating it and warning them of it), and to help them limit the harm they do (by telling them where, when, and to whom to apply violence/money/etc.).
 
Sure destruction is part of the job - it is one the main tools at our disposal. But we, as a military, have spent the last 10ish years figuring out what works better than violence - and it turns out a lot of things do. David Kilcullen (retired Australian Army officer and military theorist) once described Counterinsurgency as "armed social work." Our aim isn't to do violence - it's to "build capacity of Afghan security forces" and "show the afghan people the legitimacy of Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan." The phrasing may sound forced, but they're legitimate goals. We have a lot of tools - money and knowledge being two primary ones. Violence is rarely the first tool we go for. In this war, a platoon or company's mission is rarely "attack that compound," it's more often "secure this village while the commander tries to convice these elders not to cooperate with the Taliban." Often times we've tried too hard to model Afghanistan after the US (strong central government and counter-narcotics come to mind as two bad ideas), but on a small scale, we try to do good and, I think, tend to help people.

 

On a large scale, on the whole, I don't know if any of the places we've been are better off today because of US military intervention.

 
The wars themselves.... The Iraq war was a mistake. Probably not illegal - just stupid. It was a bad idea to do it in the first place, and it took the height of arrogance to believe that the war would turn out well after the inital invasion. Most of that blame, I think lays on the political leadership of the time (Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Cheny). Some blame should go to the Pentagon - we had plenty of Generals and Colonels who either bought into their own "optimistic plans" or were too afraid (especially after the Administration's reaction to the comments of GEN Shinseki) to speak up to say that the plan was bad.
 
I think a more legitimate case can be made for the invasion of Afghanistan - as long as you avoid mission creep - which we've not been able to do. If we had limited our goals to, "prevent international terrorist groups from using Afghanistan as a base from which to launch spectacular attacks against the United States and its allies," we could have packed up our toys and gone home in 2002 or 2003. As long as we left some CIA and SOF folk behind to keep an eye on things, we would have been done. But, like gamblers, politicians can't quit while they're ahead. Since the Commander in Chief said we were all in, we were all in, and we've been trying to make a go of Counterinsurgency/Foreign Internal Defense ever since.

 

I'm sure I'll have more to say about this as my war drags on.

 

A couple of pieces that I've read this week come to mind while I've been writing this:
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/world/asia/disconnect-clear-in-us-bafflement-over-2-afghan-responses.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all
 
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/19/more_on_command_and_control_structures_it_is_difficult_because_it_is_inherently_pol

 

 

 

Please, respond in the comments. Suggest topics for further bloviation.